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X MARKS THE SPOT WHILE 





The issue of abortion rights incites a consummate fire storm 
of controversy fueled by the passions of those rallying under the 
opposing banners of "pro-choice" and "pro-life." That contro-
versy is exacerbated by the judicial process when the courts are 
faced with crucial decisions about the content and scope of a 
woman's right to choose an abortion over a full-term pregnancy. 
In 1992, abortion law witnessed the treatment of two critical and 
divergent cases: Attorney General v. Xl from Ireland and 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey2 
from the United States. 
The Supreme Court of each nation found it necessary to 
complicate the jurisprudence of abortion doctrine, obscuring the 
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for this article, Professors Anthony Whelan and Gerry Whyte of Trinity College School 
of Law, Dublin, Ireland for all of the research material and guidance they provided and 
Professor Susan Kupfer of Golden Gate University School of Law who taught me how to 
write a good law review article. I also thank my issue editor, Rosanne Calbo-Jackson for 
her tireless reviews of this article, editor Jessica Rudin for her input and especially editor 
Donna Kotake for her help and support which were invaluable to me in accomplishing 
this feat. Finally, I thank my parents, Nijas and Asima Zenkich, who always urge me to 
strive for the superlative in all of my endeavors and my fiance, Dan Nugent, without 
whose encouragement I would not be a writer for the law review. 
1. ATIORNEY GENERAL V. X AND OTHERS. JUDGMENTS OF THE HIGH COURT AND SU-
PREME COURT, (S. McDonagh ed., The Incorporated Society of Law Reporting for Ireland 
March 1992) [hereinafter Xl. 
2. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
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nature of abortion laws which had previously been relatively 
straightforward. Each court manipulated its respective abortion 
law to reflect its own ambivalence between accommodation to 
the political and social pressures of each country and the jus-
tices' subjective beliefs about abortion. In its own way, each de-
cision represents an unsuitable use of judicial power to impart 
subjective policy as well as denigrate Supreme Court adherence 
to stare decisis. 
In X, the Irish Supreme Court considered Irish abortion law 
in the context of a pregnant girl's attempt to procure an abor-
tion in England. The Court found that although Irish law 
strictly proscribes the right to abortion in most situations, an 
exception is possible if a pregnancy presents a real and substan-
tial risk to a pregnant woman's life.s The Irish justices held that 
the pregnant girl in X could not be prohibited from procuring 
an abortion, the justices having made a determination that her 
life was at such risk, although the girl herself was the risk.· 
In Casey, the United States Supreme Court adjudicated the 
legality of a series of abortion regulations in Pennsylvania. The 
plurality opinion upheld four significant regulations which hin-
der a woman's access to abortion by mandating that a doctor 
provide a pregnant woman with "anti-abortion" literature prior 
to abortion, that a woman wait twenty-four hours before an 
abortion can take place, that a minor obtain parental consent to 
have an abortion unless such a minor obtains a judicial decree 
allowing the abortion and that abortion facilities provide de-
tailed reports of their abortion activity to the state. G However, 
the plurality opinion struck down a regulation requiring that 
pregnant women notify their husbands before procuring 
abortions.6 
This article studies and defines abortion law in Ireland after 
X and in the United States after Casey. It addresses how these 
decisions affect Irish and American women's rights, respectively, 
to secure an abortion. It also scrutinizes the justices' opinions 
and criticizes the reasoning for their holdings. 
3. X at 60, 88, 10!. 
4. Id. at 62, 89, 97, 10!. 
5. Casey at 2832, 2867-72 (plurality opinion) (3-4-2 decision). 
6. Id. at 2832, 2843-54, 2838-43 (plurality opinion) (3-2-4· decision). 
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This article argues that both Courts changed their nations' 
straightforward abortion laws to reach decisions that the courts 
felt would be more palatable to their respective political constit-
uencies and satisfy their own subjective beliefs. On the one 
hand, the Irish court declined to abide by the traditionally con-
servative position denying abortion rights as codified in the Irish 
Constitution.7 Rather, motivated by humanitarian concerns for 
the individual defendant in this situation, the Court pursued a 
more liberal interpretation of Irish abortion law. The Irish 
Court, therefore, broadened the law so more women would be 
eligible to procure abortions. On the other hand, the U.S. Su-
preme Court vitiated the liberal standards of Roe v. Wade. 9 Al-
though, it re-articulated Roe's basic holding, the Court left 
women vulnerable to state intervention which will impinge their 
abortion rights. 
Courts should recognize a woman's right to choice in the 
matter of abortion because each individual woman should be 
able to control her own body and life without input or interven-
tion from a moralistic and subjectively-inclined judiciary. There-
fore, the Irish Court's liberalizing approach to Irish abortion law 
in X was superior to the American Court's restrictive disposition 
towards American abortion law in Casey. 
II. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. X 
Attorney General v. X involved an Irish girl who, with the 
help of her parents, attempted to secretlylO secure an abortion 
outside of Ireland. ll However, her efforts to do so were thwarted 
by the Irish authorities when they learned what the girl planned 
to do. 12 She and her parents decided to challenge the authorities 
ori this matter in the Irish courts.13 This case quickly caught the 
7. See infra note 32. 
8. This standard was liberal in that it allowed women to procure abortions rela-
tively free from state intervention. State intervention in abortion activity could only pass 
constitutional muster if it met the strict scrutiny standard. See infra note 219. 
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that right to abortion is 
grounded in constitutional right of privacy). This article considers only one aspect of the 
Casey decision: how Casey debased Roe. 
10. See infra note 23. 
11. X at 9. 
12. Id. at 9-10. 
13. Id. at 10. 
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attention of the Irish (as well as international) media and trig-
gered passions on both sides of the abortion issue, both before 
and after the Irish Supreme court ruled in the girl's favor. 
A. CASE ANALYSIS 
1. Facts 
The main party in this case was a fourteen and a half year 
old girl, X, who had a playmate whom she frequently visited at 
the playmate's home.14 Unknown to anyone, the playmate's fa-
ther had been molesting X since before she had reached her 
thirteenth birthday. 111 In December 1991, the father had noncon-
sensual sexual intercourse with her, and consequently she be-
came pregnant.16 On January 27, 1992, she finally told her par-
ents about the crimes committed against her by her friend's 
father during the preceding year and a half.17 Also on that day, 
X's doctor informed her and her parents that X was pregnant. IS 
She "naturally was distraught and upset. "19 X told her mother 
that when she discovered she was pregnant, she wanted to throw 
herself down some stairs and kill herself.20 
The gardai (Irish police) were informed of the crimes 
shortly thereafter2l and took a full statement after X's doctor 
confirmed her pregnancy.22 A short while later, X and her par-
ents decided she should have an abortion and would go to Eng-
land for that purpose.23 They told the gardai of their plan and 
left for England a few days later.24 While in England, they 
learned that a court had ordered an injunction against their in-
tended course of action, and they voluntarily returned to Ireland 
to fight the injunction.211 





19. Id. at 10. 
20.Id. 
21. Id. at 9. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. Due to the close proximity of the two countries, Irish women often go to 
England to receive secret, legal abortions. 
24.Id. 
25. Id. at 10. 
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On the journey back from England, X told her mother that 
she "had wanted to throw herself in front of a train when she 
was in London and that ... she would rather be dead than con-
tinue as she was."26 On a few other occasions, X expressed simi-
lar death wishes.27 
A clinical psychologist examined X and filed a report on her 
condition.28 He found that while X "was cooperative, she was 
emotionally withdrawn, . . . in a state of shock and had lost 
touch with her feelings," and that although she did not seem 
depressed, "she 'coldly expressed a desire to solve matters by 
ending her life.' "29 He believed that X was capable of killing 
herself, "not so much because she is depressed but because "she 
could calculatingly reach the conclusion that death is the best 
solution. "30 The doctor concluded that if X were to carry the 
child, it would be "devastating" to her mental health and "con-
siderable" to her psychological well-being.31 
2. Procedural History 
On February 6, 1992, the Attorney General filed a plenary 
summons against X and her parents requesting an order re-
straining the defendants from violating rights guaranteed to the 
unborn under Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution,32 an in-
junction restraining X from leaving Ireland for nine months or 
other period specified by the court, and an order restraining X 
from obtaining an abortion.33 The High Court34 issued a prelimi-
nary injunction on the summons, and the defendants subse-
quently filed an interlocutory appeal with the same court.35 The 





30. [d. at 10-11. 
31. [d. at 11. 
32. The Constitution provides, "The State acknowledges the right to life of the un-
born and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws 
to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its law to defend and vindicate that right." IR. 
CONST. art. 40, § 3(3). 
33. X at 8. 
34. [d. This court is analogous to a United States federal district court. 
35. [d. 
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tions be treated as the case on the merits.36 
a. The High Court's Decision and National Law 
The High Court judge believed that the courts must recog-
nize the mother's right to life equally with the fetus's right to 
life (as required by Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution).37 Here, 
however, he found that the mother's life was threatened by the 
mother herself. He deemed this risk to be of a "different order 
and magnitude" than the certainty that the fetus would die if an 
injunction were not granted.38 Therefore, in this balance, the 
High Court judge decided an injunction should not be granted.39 
Furthermore, he opined that even though Irish law declares a 
Constitutional right to personal liberty [including the right to 
travel],40 this right cannot be abused "to commit a wrong"41 
(e.g., going abroad to obtain an abortion). He concluded that, in 
such a case, the courts could prevent a person from doing [such] 
a wrong even if it means restricting one of that individual's per-
sonal rights.42 
b. The High Court's Decision and European Community 
(EC) Law43 
The High Court judge noted that, although EC law must 
36. [d. 
37. [d. at 14. See supra note 32. 
38. [d. See supra note 32. 
39. [d. at 14-15. 
40. The Supreme Court Justices never cite the authority for the right to travel in X. 
The right to travel is not expressed in the Irish Constitution, rather it is a common law 
creation. As a recent Supreme Court case declared, the right to travel is a non-expressed 
or unenumerated right (stemming from the constitutional right to liberty). Murray v. 
Ireland, 1991 I.L.R.M. 465 (1991). 
41. [d. at 15. 
42. [d. 
43. Ireland, being a Member State of the Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) has certain responsibilities to the EEC. One of the Treaty's 
cardinal requirements is that restraints on the freedom to provide services within the 
EEC are to be abolished. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
IEEC TREATY) art. 59. The European Court of Justice (the judicial branch of the EEC) 
has decided that abortion is a service. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v. 
Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (lr. 1991). However, the Court of Justice has not decided 
whether abortion may be excluded from the Treaty's requirement that restrictions on 
services be abolished because of its controversial nature to some Member States. (Inter-
national law and its effects on the decisions in X and on Irish abortion law overall is 
6
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normally prevail over Irish law,44 the EC has made exceptions to 
this rule. He discussed one important exception: if a Member 
State's public policy, public security or public health is at risk, it 
may deviate from EC law in this area in order to prevent that 
risk.411 EC law would not likely deny a Member State. [Ireland 
being one] an exemption to an EC decree based on that Member 
State's particular moral obligation to its citizens [e.g., Ireland 
protecting the lives of the unborn as required by its Constitu-
tionJ.46 Thus, the High Court judge concluded that, in this situa-
tion, a national law would preempt EC law, and, therefore, an 
injunction could issue against X leaving Ireland to procure an 
abortion.47 
The Irish Supreme Court reversed the High Court's deci-
sion. Four of the five Supreme Court justices decided that an 
injunction should not issue in this case.48 The sole dissenter 
would have permitted it.49 
Additionally, the four justices in the majority agreed that 
when the right to life (of the fetus) is balanced against the right 
to travel in this case, the former does not automatically prevail 
over the latter. In fact, they decided that the right to travel 
should prevail in this case. IIO 
B. LAWS RELEVANT TO THIS CASE 
Numerous Irish legal and political issues were involved in 
this case. They were further complicated by international legal 
and political factors. 
1. Irish Law 
The main Irish law at issue in this case was Article 40.3.3 of 
the Irish Constitution which provides: "the State acknowledges 
discussed infra.) 
44. X at 15. 
45. [d. at 16. 
46. [d. at 18. 
47. [d. at 19. 
48. [d. at 62, 89, 97, 10l. 
49. [d. at 83. 
50. [d. at 64, 94, 97, 102. 
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the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal 
right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, 
as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that 
right. "III 
Another fundamental law at issue in X was the right to 
travel which all of the justices agree exists in Irish law.1I2 
The final "local" law cited in X was a 1939, common law 
case from England, Rex v. Bourne.1I3 In that case, a fifteen year 
old girl had been raped and consequently became pregnant.1I4 A 
doctor openly performed an abortion on the victim and was 
charged with "unlawfully procuring the abortion of the girl" 
under section 58 of the Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861.1111 
The Bourne court had decided that in order for the defendant 
doctor to be proven guilty, the prosecution would have had to 
unequivocally show that the doctor did not perform this surgery 
only to save the victim's life.1I6 The Bourne court had deter-
mined that preventing the victim from becoming "a physical and 
mental wreck" was one of the possible maladies from which the 
defendant could have spared the victim by performing the abor-
tion. 1I7 Although this case had come from a jurisdiction other 
than Ireland, the Irish Supreme Court apparently deemed it suf-
ficiently persuasive precedent to cite it favorably in the X 
decision. 
2. International Law 
International law plays a large part in Ireland's jurispru-
dence because the Irish government ratified the European Con-
vention on Human Rightsll8 and Ireland is a member of the 
51. IR. CONST. art. 40, § 3(3). 
52. Gerry Whyte, Abortion and the Law, in DOCTRINE AND LIFE 264 (Gerry Whyte et 
al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter Whyte). 
53. Rex v. Bourne, 3 All E.R. 615 (K.B. 1939). 
54. [d. at 619. 
55. [d. at 615. Section 58 of the Act provides," Every woman being with child who, 
with intent to procure her own miscarriage ... and whosoever, with intent to procure 
the miscarriage of any woman . . . shall be guilty of felony. " X at 100, citing the Of-
fenses Against the Person Act, 1861, ch. 100, § 58 (Eng.). 
56. Bourne at 616. 
57. [d. at 619. 
58. Once a nation ratifies this Convention, it must abide by the Convention's ex-
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss3/9
1993] U.S. & IRISH ABORTION LAW 1009 
a. The European Convention On Human Rights (ECHR) 
The ECHR's provisions define the term "human rights" and 
establish what ECHR members' duties are with regard to human· 
rights.60 The ECHR's court, the Court of Human Rights (CHR), 
determines whether human rights are being violated in specific 
situations. All Member States of the EC are parties to the 
ECHR and "there is no doubt that the rights protected by the 
ECHR are [European Economic Community] human rights."6! 
Among the ECHR~s many provisions, three are most rele-
vant to the abortion issue and the X case: the right to life,62 the 
right to privacy63 and the prohibition against inhuman and de-
grading treatment of people.64 The ECHR also contains some 
law pertaining to the right to travel: the Fourth Protocol to the 
ECHR says that one "has the right to leave one's country," but 
there has been very little case law in this area.611 
Even if there are no express provisions in the ECHR regard-
ing a particular issue, that issue may still fall within the ECHR's 
jurisdiction if the CHR determines that one or more of its provi-
sions are underlying aspects of the main issue.66 For example, 
although there are no provisions regarding abortion per se in the 
ECHR, abortion may still fall within the ECHR's jurisdiction. 
The sections of the ECHR discussed above are some of the areas 
at issue in cases involving abortion.67 They are relevant to Irish 
abortion law because an EC Member State's legal decisions re-
press provisions as well as the decisions of the Court of Human Rights. Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Preamble, 
arts. 1, 45, 53, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
59. Ireland has certain obligations to the EEC by being a member. As a member, it 
must refrain from jeopardizing the achievements of the Treaty's objectives. EEC TREATY 
art. 5. 
60. ECHR Preamble, arts. 2-18. 
61. T. C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ·EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 137 (2d ed. 
1991) [hereinafter Hartley]. 
62. ECHR art. 2. 
63. ECHR art. 8. 
64. ECHR art. 3. 
65. Whyte at 264. 
66. ECHR arts. 49-50. 
67. See infra notes 100-107 and accompanying text. 
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garding issues that deal with human rights could be influenced 
or altered by the ECHR. Since Ireland is a member of the EC, it 
must abide by ECHR provisions and decisions if and when the 
CHR gives a ruling.68 
b. The Treaty Establishing The European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) 
The EC was established to ensure the economic and social 
progress for the Member States69 "by common action to elimi-
nate the barriers which divide Europe."70 The Treaty further 
provides how the EEC's economic and social goals are to be 
met.71 Some of the current EC laws which govern Member 
States are the provisions in the EEC,72 decisions made by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ)73 and directives issued by the 
Commission and Council74 of the EEC.711 Therefore, since Ire-
land is a member of the EC, it must abide by the above. 
Article 59 of the EEC Treaty prohibits Member States from 
imposing restrictions on EC citizens who wish to provide ser-
vices in the EC.76 Article 60 defines "services."77 The ECJ de-
cided that performing an abortion is a service within the mean-
ing of Article 60.78 In Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro,79 
the ECJ expanded the parameters of EC law by extending the 
right to travel to "any national who seeks to cross a border and 
68. Hartley at 137. 
69. The Member States to the Treaty are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United 
Kingdom. 
70. EEC TREATY Preamble. 
71. EEC TREATY arts. 1-248. 
72. EEC TREATY art. 5. 
73. See supra note 43. 
74. EEC TREATY art. 4. The Commission and Council are legislative-type branches 
created by the EEC. EEC TREATY arts. 145, 155. 
75. EEC TREATY art. 189. 
76. EEC TREATY art. 59. 
77. "Services" includes activities of craftsmen, the professions, etc. EEC TREATY art. 
60. 
78. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v. Grogan, 62 C.M.L.R. 849 (lr. 
1991). 
79. Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, 3 C.M.L.R. 52 (Italy 1985), cited in 
James Kingston & Anthony Whelan, The Protection of the Unborn in Three Legal Or-
ders - Part III, IRISH LAW TIMES, July 1992 [hereinafter Kingston & Whelan, Part III]. 
10
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has the means to pay for some sort of service. "80 The Council 
reinforced the ECJ's decision in Luisi in Directive 73/148/EEC 
which requires Member States to abolish restrictions on people 
traveling to other Member States to obtain services.81 
Thus, Irish law on abortion, as decided in X, seems to be in 
direct conflict with EC law in this area. Irish women ostensibly 
cannot be restricted from traveling abroad to procure an abor-
tion under EC law because EC law supersedes national law.82 
However, this apparent conflict between the laws is illusory be-
cause Article 56 of the EEC Treaty as well as Article 8 of Direc-
tive 73/148 allows a Member State to deviate from the Treaty 
and Directive, respectively, on grounds of public policy.83 The 
Supreme Court did not address this in the X decision because it 
allowed X to travel to England to abort her fetus. 84 Neverthe-
less, the High Court judge who would not have allowed X to 
travel to England to secure an abortion, felt that the treaty re-
quired him to address this issue.8t1 
In addition, new EC law may soon play an important role in 
the abortion issue. A plan to unite the EC into a federation, with 
all federal laws (not just economic ones) superseding Member 
State's laws, is scheduled to become effective as soon as it is rat-
ified by the Member States86 in EC national referendums.87 This 
plan, called the Maastricht Treaty, would create the United 
States of Europe and was to become operative in January 1993.88 
However, not all of the Member States had adopted it as 
planned, which made meeting the January 1993 deadline impos-
sible. For example, in June 1992, the Danes voted against it,89 
possibly anticipating problems arising out of Maastricht's main 
80. Kingston & Whelan, Part III at 166. 
81. Id . 
. 82.Id. 
83.Id. 
84. X at 62, 89, 97, 101. 
85. Kingston & Whelan, Part III at 166. X at 15. See supra notes 44, 78 and accom-
panying text. 
86. See supra note 69. 
87. Matthew C. Vita, European Nations Meet to Chart Course for Unity, THE AT-
LANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 9, 1991, at AI. 
88.Id. 
89. Jonathan Kaufman, Danish Electorate Rejects Terms of European Community 
Treaty, BOSTON GLOBE, June 3, 1992, at 1. 
11
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objective of greater economic and new political unity.90 Ireland, 
however, voted in favor of the Treaty on June 18, 1992.91 
However, even had the Maastricht Treaty been adopted as 
planned, the Member States carved out a special exception to it 
known as Protocol 17.92 Protocol 17 provides, "Nothing in the 
Treaty on European Union or in the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or 
supplementing those Treaties, shall affect the application in Ire-
land of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland."93 The Pro-
tocol was enacted to resolve a political dilemma, created by dis-
gruntled conservative as well as liberal factions, facing the Irish 
government. The conservative parties behind the ratification of 
Article 40.3.3 were upset with the Supreme Court for its decision 
in X. The Protocol failed to appease their liberal opponents who 
feared that pregnant women, whose lives were not threatened by 
their pregnancies, could be restrained from leaving Ireland if the 
Protocol became operative.94 
To resolve the political dilemma facing the Irish govern-
ment, the Member States attached the Solemn Declaration to 
the Maastricht Treaty on May 1, 1992.95 The Solemn Declara-
tion states, "that it was and is the intention [of the Member 
States] that the Protocol shall not limit freedom ... to travel 
between Member States. . . . "96 
C. How X AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AFFECTS A WOMAN'S RIGHT 
TO SECURE AN ABORTION 
In order for Irish women to stay within the confines of the 
90. Most Danes fear that accomplishing this objective would result in losing too 
much of their national sovereignty, being dominated by Germany and losing social pro-
grams.ld. 
91. Joel Havemann, Europe Treaty Gets Big Boost in Irish Vote, L. A. TIMES, June 
20, 1992, at AI. As of the time this article was submitted for publication, France and 
Germany had also approved the Maastricht Treaty. John J. WaIte, French: Yes to Union 
Treaty, U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 21, 1992, at AI. Germany Ratifies Maastricht Treaty, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1992, at A4. 
92. Whyte at 256-257. The Irish government requested that the exception be in-
cluded and the other Member States approved it. 
93. Kingston & Whelan, Part III at 168. 
94. Whyte at 257-58. 
95. Id. at 258. 
96. Id. at 254, citing the Solemn Declaration to the Maastricht Treaty. 
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law on abortion in their country, they must grapple with a num-
ber of aspects of that law. 
First, Irish national law limits abortions only to pregnant 
women whose lives are at a real and substantial risk if they carry 
their pregnancies to term.97 Thus, it seems if a woman's life is 
not really and substantially at risk, and she tells the authorities 
that she intends to go abroad to procure an abortion, she could 
be enjoined from doing so. This is true despite the existence of a 
fundamental right to travel because the right to travel will usu-
ally be subordinate to the right to life (of the unborn fetus).98 
Ironically, since even a pregnant woman's mere verbal threats of 
suicide suffice to meet the real and substantial risk test, it seems 
any pregnant woman could easily meet that burden. 
The standard is rather amorphous; whether there is a real 
and substantial risk to the mother's life is a matter of judgment, 
so there is always room for debate.99 As a result of the X deci-
sion, the chances are very good for a pregnant woman to con-
vince the State that her life is at real and substantial risk by the 
pregnancy, and that she should be allowed to abort. 
Second, there are international pressures (the ECHR, EC 
law and perhaps the Maastricht Treaty) encouraging the Irish 
authorities to allow women to leave the State and obtain all le-
gal services available in other Member States. These pressures 
necessarily force Ireland toward a more liberal abortion policy. 
The ECHR may play a role "in reconciling Irish abortion 
laws with supra-national human rights standards."loo However, 
where the Commission of the ECHR has dealt with abortion, it 
has been rather evasive in its decision-making. lOl For example, 
in one case, the Commission expressly refused to decide whether 
97. Whyte at 259. The other limitation is that the one performing the surgery must 
have a bona fide belief that the mother's life is at stake by continuation of the preg-
nancy. ld. at 260. This is important because "abortion providers" should know their legal 
responsibilities. 
98. Three of the four justices held this belief. X at 62, 97, 101. 
99. Whyte at 261. 
100. James Kingston & Anthony Whelan, The Protection of the Unborn in Three 
Legal Orders - Part l, IRISH LAW TIMES, April 1992, at 94 [hereinafter Kingston & Whe-
lan, Part I]. 
101. ld. 
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an unborn life was covered by the right to life provision. l02 It 
thus appeared to support abortion rights. But in another case, it 
"rejected the possibility that [the right to life provision] gave an 
unqualified right to life to the foetus [sic]. "103 Therefore, unless 
the Commission takes a definitive stance against abortion under 
the right to life provision, it apparently remains an avenue 
through which the ECHR may liberalize Irish abortion law. Fur-
thermore, the Commission could become active on the abortion 
issue under the ECHR's prohibition of inhuman or degrading 
treatment of people. 1M Forcing a woman to carry a pregnancy to 
term, which makes her a "physical and mental wreck,"lol! could 
arguably constitute such proscribed maltreatment. loe Finally, al-
though the ECHR's "right to leave [one's country]" is relatively 
weak,107 it is yet another avenue through which the ECHR can 
make . decisions favoring liberal abortion laws. All of the provi-
sions in the ECHR relevant to the abortion issue may provide 
such avenues. Although the ECHR's activities regarding abor-
tion may not have been very extensive in the past, there is no 
indication this "pattern" will continue in the future. Because the 
ECHR has the support of the EC behind it,108 any decisions 
made by the ECHR dealing with abortion will have significance 
for Irish wo~en. 
EC law is tremendously important to Irish women. The ma-
jority of the Supreme Court did not address EC law in X be-
cause it felt that the case could be resolved on national law 
grounds. However, the High Court justice felt obligated to con-
sider EC law in his decision in X.I09 His nationalist approach to 
EC law in the area of abortion provides good insight into how 
102. [d., citing Bruggeman & Scheu ten v. Germany, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 100 (1978). 
103. Kingston & Whelan, Part [ at 94-9S, citing Paton v. U.K., 19 Eur. Comm'n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 194 (1980). 
104. Kingston & Whelan, Part [ at 9S. 
lOS. Bourne at 619. 
106. Kingston & Whelan, Part [ at 9S. However, some experts feel that although the 
ECHR permits abortion, it will not likely lay the ground work for intervention in the 
area of abortion by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the court of the EEC. James 
Kingston & Anthony Whelan, The Protection of the Unborn in Three Legal Orders -
Part II, IRISH LAW TIMES, May 1992, at 107 [hereinafter Kingston & Whelan, Part II]. 
107. Kingston & Whelan, Part [ at 9S, citing VAN DIJK AND VAN HOOF, THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 491 (2d ed., 1990). 
108. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
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the Supreme Court could have decided X had it felt the neces-
sity of using EC law in its holding. Like the High Court justice, 
the Supreme Court could have decided that X did not meet her 
burden of proof to be allowed to deviate from the Constitutional 
law proscribing abortion - even under the (national) real and 
substantial risk test that the Supreme Court majority alone 
used. It then could have looked at the fundamental right to 
travel (to obtain services lawfully available in another Member 
State) in EC law and decided that Ireland would not be violat-
ing that supreme law based on Ireland's moral· convictions on 
the subject of abortion.110 
Although the Supreme Court did not follow the High 
Court's approach to abortion rights in X, based on current na-
tional and international law, Irish women are not completely 
safe from future interference in their abortion rights. Ireland 
could, through a successful national referendum,lll clarify Arti-
cle 40.3.3 and truly restrict abortion rights to emergencies 
threatening the mother's life. If that were the case, the Supreme 
Court would be forced to act as the High Court did in X. The 
Court would be forced to deviate from EC law, because abortion 
is a subject which Ireland can adjudicate for itself on grounds of 
(clear) public policy, and prevent pregnant women and girls like 
X from leaving Ireland to procure abortions. 
Finally, future EC law in the form of the Maastricht Treaty, 
especially Protocol 17112 and the Solemn Declaration of May 1, 
1992113 could affect Irish abortion rights. If the Treaty is rati-
fied, it could seriously effect Irish abortion law. Not only do 
fears of anticipated problems with the main objective of the 
Treaty exist,114 but there also seems to be a conflict between the 
two "amendments" to the Maastricht Treaty. Experts feel that 
Protocol 17 was added to the Treaty in response to the ECJ's 
decision in Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v. 
Grogan which hinted that abortion clinics from abroad might be 
able to distribute abortion information in Ireland. I IIi 
110. X at 18. 
111. See infra note 263 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
115. Kingston & Whelan, Part III at 169. See Society for the Protection of Unborn 
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The Protocol is legally binding116 and, by itself, might have 
appeased many Irish conservatives because it would seemingly 
have prohibited the EC courts from tampering with Ireland's 
abortion laws. However, the Solemn Declaration, although of 
questionable authority, cannot be completely dismissed. 
On the one hand, for reasons which are unclear, some ex-
perts feel that the Solemn Declaration does not have any legal 
effect.ll7 If the Declaration is not in fact legally binding, it prob-
ably would not disturb the Irish conservatives who are pacified 
by the Protocol. They could continue to feel secure because the 
Declaration would not likely have any impact on EC law11s 
(which would thus not effect abortion law in the EC or in 
Ireland). 
On the other hand, for reasons which are equally unclear, 
some believe that the Declaration is now highly persuasive,119 
which means that it could be strongly considered by EC courts 
in any abortion case under the Maastricht federalist system. In 
turn, this could have an impact on abortion law at the national 
level which would be highly objectionable to Irish conservatives. 
It remains to be seen which school of experts is correct in its 
assessment of the Declaration's strength. 
How much weight the Declaration carries will not be deter-
mined until the entire EC ratifies the Maastricht Treaty. It may 
prove to have no impact on Irish abortion law as it stands today, 
or it may liberalize that law tremendously. How the ECJ deals 
with the Protocol and the Declaration if and when the Maas-
tricht Treaty passes could have a significant impact on Irish 
women. The ECJ's reputation for being a proponent of main-
taining and expanding the EC's legal jurisdiction could result in 
Children v. Grogan, 62 C.M.L.R. 849 (lr. 1991). Distribution of such material is some-
thing that would be highly objectionable to the Irish Supreme Court which expressly 
rejected the idea that information about the availability of abortions abroad could be 
provided to pregnant Irish women. Whyte at 255, citing Attorney General v. Open Door 
Counseling, 1988 I.R. 593 (1988). Information about the availability of abortions abroad 
is available only through "subversive sources." For example, women write the phone 
numbers of abortion clinics in bathroom stalls, put stickers bearing abortion numbers on 
cars, etc. However, it is clear that such activity is illegal. 
116. Whyte at 263. 
117. Id. at 266. 
118. Id. at 267. 
119. Kingston & Whelan, Part III at 169. 
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the liberalization of Ireland's abortion laws120 - at least on the 
EC front. However, the conservatives at the national level would 
certainly put up a tremendous fight before any further liberali-
zation could take place in Ireland. 
D. THE IRISH SUPREME COURT'S SHREWD ApPROACH TO THE 
ABORTION ISSUE CAUSED BY PUBLIC PRESSURE 
The Republic of Ireland's political and legal traditions are 
deeply grounded in Catholic dogma. 121 Conservative Catholics 
were the driving force behind Article 40.3.3 of the Constitu-
tion. 122 The Irish people have long been embroiled in the abor-
tion issue. In 1983, in an effort to prevent future challenge by 
liberals, the conservatives moved to pass a constitutional law to 
proscribe abortion. 123 The conservatives were successful and 
thus Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution was adopted via 
amendment. 124 
After the enactment of Article 40.3.3 in 1983, the interna-
tional media paid relatively little attention to the abortion issue 
in Ireland until the X controversy began. Much of the interna-
tional as well as Irish public was outraged by the High Court's 
decision not allowing X to leave the jurisdiction to procure an 
abortion.l2II However, many Irish conservatives supported the 
High Court's decision. Consequently, the Supreme Court 
maneuvered strategically to appease both sides on the abortion 
issue in this highly publicized case. 
1. The Opinions of the Irish Supreme Court in X 
Chief Justice Thomas Finlay is conservative126 but prag-
120. Liberalization of Ireland's abortion laws would result from the ECJ's enforce-
ment of the fundamental right to travel. 
121. R. F. FOSTER, MODERN IRELAND 520, 544, 567-68, 571, 581, 594 (1988). 
122. Irish Vote Puts Abortion Ban in Charter, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1983, at 
A13. 
123. Trying to Slam the Door: a Bitter Debate on a Dubious Abortion Law, TIME, 
Sept. 19, 1983, at 42. 
124. See supra note 32. 
125. Dennis Duggan, Abortion Protests Shake Ireland; Court Hears Girl's Appeal, 
NEWSDAY, Feb. 26, 1992, at 7. Paul Majendie, Ireland Under Spotlight over Abortion, 
REUTER LIB. REP., Feb. 24, 1992. 
126. The definition of a "conservative" in Ireland does not differ from its American 
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matic, and he "tried to please the world [in this case]."127 The 
substantive part of his decision began with a qualifier - the 
court should use current "prevailing ideas and concepts"128 in its 
Constitutional decision-making.129 This premise came from dicta . 
of a 1974 decision. l3O Although the legitimacy and strength of 
this premise was questionable, he did not attempt to inconspicu-
ously hide it in the text. Rather, by having boldly presented this 
uncertain premise he seemed to indicate that he would be taking 
certain "liberties" in adjudicating this case. 
The Chief Justice used a test which allows for a pregnant 
woman to abort when "it is established [sic] as a matter of 
probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life of 
the mother, which can only be avoided by the termination of her 
pregnancy[;] such termination is permissible,131 .having regard to 
the true interpretation of Article 40[.3.3] of the Constitution."132 
This test was presented by the defense counsel based on the pre-
cise wording in Article 40.3.3 and the facts in X. 133 However, 
there was no precedential basis for accepting this test as the ap-
propriate standard here. The Chief Justice simply accepted it in 
accordance with his own concepts of "prudence, justice and 
charity."134 The Chief Justice, however, added a hurdle of his 
own to the "real and substantial" test. He insisted that the risk 
be to the mother's life, as distinguished from the mother's 
health,1311 which the defense counsel did not expressly require in 
his version.136 It seems that the Chief Justice added this provi-
sion so as to assure conservative members of the population that 
only in very limited and exacting situations could the burden be 
counterpart. 
127. Personal interview with Anthony Whelan, Law Professor at Trinity College 
School of Law, Dublin, Ireland, July I, 1992. Professor Whelan has written numerous 
articles in law journals regarding the issue of abortion in Ireland. 
128. Apparently this language means current public opinion. 
129. X at 59-60. 
130. [d. at 58-59, citing McGee v. Attorney General, 1974 I.R. 284 (1972). Interest-
ingly, he is the only one who introduced the prevailing ideas and concepts theory in the 
X decision. Perhaps this is because the other justices do not feel it is a principle that is 
appropriate here. 
131. X at 60. 
132. [d. See supra note 32. 
133. X at 54-55. 
134. Id. at 59. These concepts are along the lines of "prevailing ideas and concepts," 
which incidentally come from the same dicta in that 1974 case. See supra note 130. 
135. X at 60. 
136. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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met. 
The Chief Justice's version of the test might have been ac-
ceptable with respect to the underlying concepts behind Article 
40.3.3 (and even with respect to the conservatives) if it were not 
for his holding that the risk to X's life was real and substantial 
and that she should have been allowed to have the abortion.137 
The evidence in the record in support of the defense was that X 
had told her mother that she wanted to throw herself 'down 
some stairs and that she was tempted to throw herself in front 
of a train.13s The record did not indicate that X had actually 
taken any action in preparation to make her suicide "threats" a 
real possibility. The only other real evidence was the opinion of 
the psychologist who examined her.139 He had found that X was 
in shock, was capable of killing herself and could come to the 
conclusion that she would be better off dead.140 The proof 
presented in her behalf was tenuous at best. 
It is difficult to believe that so little probative evidence 
could meet the real and substantial risk test as laid out by the 
Chief Justice, but he nevertheless held for X. Why? The only 
plausible answer was that he felt the need to yield to public 
pressure which demanded that X be allowed to leave the juris-
diction to obtain an abortion.l41 The Chief Justice tried to estab-
lish a vehicle - prevailing ideas and concepts - for legitimating 
his entire opinion. However, this vehicle could not factually tip 
the balance in X's favor. The evidence in the case alone should 
have established that X should be entitled to procure an abor-
tion, yet it was not substantial enough to have done that. 
In reality, the law was too harsh on a defendant such as X. 
That fact outraged the public, and the Chief Justice was appar-
ently swept up by this public sentiment. Perhaps he also felt 
137. X at 62. 
138. See supra notes 20, 26, 29 and accompanying text. 
139. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
140. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. The doctor stated that it would 
be devastating to X's health and mental weI/-being if she had to carry the pregnancy to 
term. Such evidence is "expressly banned" by the Chief Justice's version of the test. 
[emphasis added). See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
141. Although many Irish are devout Catholics who do not believe in abortion, a 
large segment of the population took a liberal stance, given the facts in this case, and 
demanded that the Supreme Court overturn the High Court's ruling. See supra note 125. 
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that the Court could do nothing to stop X from having the abor-
tion, regardless of the Court's decision, as the defense counsel 
seemed to hint at the outset of the proceedings.142 Maybe he 
made his decision for all of those reasons or none of them. In 
any case, the main reasons which are supposed to support judi-
cial decisions are those which have some legal and factual basis. 
Very little in the Chief Justice's opinion supported his holding 
that X had met the real and substantial risk burden such that 
she should have been able to leave Ireland to procure an 
abortion. 
The Chief Justice also declared in dicta that the right to 
travel is normally inferior to the right to life.143 This concept 
seemed to be the basis for a subsequent finding that this case 
did not need to be referred to the European Court of Justice.144 
He felt that it could be decided under Irish law only and thus 
did not need to be adjudicated under EC law, as provided in 
Article 17714/', of the EEC.146 Thus, although the right to travel 
issue is not relevant to the decision in X per se, it is an impor-
tant aspect of EC law which could bear on future Irish abortion 
cases. 
The Chief Justice was possibly laying "middle ground work" 
for future decisions. Many people in Ireland still hold a strong 
unfavorable view toward abortion147 - such that even other 
Constitutional rights (let alone EC laws) must yield to the rights 
of the unborn. The travel dicta was probably meant to keep con-
servatives from becoming anxious that Article 40.3.3 will become 
ineffectual in light of X and potential changes in EC law. The 
Chief Justice perhaps assumed that the liberals would be 
pleased with the decision in X's favor and would not likely be 
overly disturbed by the travel section in his opinion. Moreover, 
142. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
143. X at 64. 
144. Recall that the European Court of Justice is the judicial branch of the EEC. 
145. "Where [questions concerning the interpretation of the EEC, the validity and 
interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community, the interpretation of the 
statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council ... are] raised before any court 
or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision 
on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to 
give a ruling thereon." EEC TREATY art. 177. 
146. X at 68. 
147. Paul Majendie, Most Irish Want Blanket Ban on Abortion Modified - Survey, 
REUTER LIB. REP., Mar. 2, 1992. 
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the travel dicta was possibly also meant as a warning to the EC 
that, despite this decision, the EC has a formidable legal chal-
lenge if it plans to allow the EC right to travel to prevail over 
national policy. 
Justice Niall McCarthy is a "known liberal."148 He began his 
argument with the provocative statement that abortion always 
results in the fetus's death while for the mother, even if she de-
cides not to abort, death is only a probability, not a certainty.H9 
Because of this, he believed that it could not be a question of 
balancing the two lives, otherwise, the fetus would always pre-
vail in the balance.15o Justice McCarthy explained, however, that 
the Constitutional protection of the unborn is qualified by the 
requirement of due regard to the mother's life and is made even 
less absolute by the provision that the fetal life could only be 
vindicated as far as practicable. 151 
His opinion, although grounded in the Constitution, may 
not have been as legitimate as it appeared because Justice Mc-
Carthy also subscribed to the test which the defense counsel 
presented without much legal basis.152 Justice McCarthy opined 
that, in paying due regard to the mother's life, when there is a 
real and substantial risk to her, it may not always be practicable 
to vindicate the right to life of the unborn.153 Like the Chief Jus-
tice, he gave no reason for using this particular test. 
Justice McCarthy felt there was ample evidence showing a 
real and substantial risk that X would commit suicide and thus 
could not be stopped from aborting her fetus. 154 This finding 
was not credible for the same reasons the Chief Justice's find-
ings on this topic were not credible. 155 
Finally, Justice McCarthy made a statement that the 
mother could not be prevented from leaving Ireland whatever 
148. See supra note 127. 
149. X at 88. 
150. [d. He thereby addressed a legitimate conservative argument. 
151. [d. at 89. He thereby addressed a legitimate liberal argument. 
152. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
153. X at 88. 
154. [d. 
155. See supra notes 137·40 and accompanying text. 
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her purpose for so doing.1I16 This assertion was based on the rea-
soning that the State could not enjoin an individual from travel-
ing abroad with the intent to commit an act which mayor may 
not be criminal in that other jurisdiction.1I17 Justice McCarthy 
did not present this assertion in a way that had any bearing on 
this case. Thus, his position on the right to travel seemed little 
more than a personal preference for a liberal right to travel pol-
icy which substantially weakened his opinion. 
Justice O'Flaherty was a surprising member of the majority 
in X because ten years prior he had campaigned for the Irish 
"pro-life movement!"1118 His opinion was difficult to discern be-
cause it contained numerous disconnected ideas: the Eighth 
Amendment being only one of many provisions in the Constitu-
tion;1119 the Constitution being committed to freedom and jus-
tice;160 the Constitution treating the family with particular rev-
erence [such that an injunction if granted would create an 
unwarranted interference with the authority of the family] ;161 
the State not being allowed to interfere with the freedom of 
movement "to this extraordinary degree;"162 the State looking to 
the economic needs of mothers so that it must also be concerned 
with mothers' health, welfare and happiness;163 and the State 
having to be positive in such a case.16" Apparently he was trying 
to create a smoke screen with all of these ideas to make a deci-
sion of "moral conscience." Such a stance was surprising coming 
from a (former?) staunch pro-life individual. He must have suc-
cumbed to the general public sentiment that the mother must 
prevail in this case. 
Justice O'Flaherty applied a different test than the other 
judges in the majority. His test provided that abortion is permis-
sible in Ireland if it "has the effect of terminating pregnancy 
bona fide undertaken to save the life of the mother .... "1611 
156. X at 94. 
157. Id. at 93. 
158. See supra note 127. 
159. X at 96. 
160. [d. 
161. [d. at 96-97. 
162. [d. at 97. 
163. [d. at 96. 
164. [d. at 97. 
165. [d. at 96 
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Justice O'Flaherty also gave no real basis for this test. His ver-
sion was no clearer than the real and substantial risk test. 
He then found that the evidence supported a finding that 
an abortion should be allowed in this case,188 but again he of-
fered no reason for reaching that holding. Justice O'Flaherty 
may have been moved by the facts of this case to hold as he did. 
It is perfectly understandable that he would want to make his 
decision in favor of X because her situation was heart-wrench-
ing. However, Justice O'Flaherty's decision should not have 
rested on predominantly emotional grounds. He should have 
substantiated his opinions with more judicially valid reasons. 
One of Justice O'Fl'aherty's last comments in this opinion 
was that the Court should not be allowed to interfere with one's 
freedom of movement to this extraordinary degree because it is 
inconsistent with one of the Constitution's basic tenets: "to as-
sure the dignity and freedom of the individual."187 This was a 
legitimate stance. It was especially laudable because Justice 
O'Flaherty is a known conservative and pro-life advocate but 
nevertheless applied this tenet to the abortion issue. I8s 
Justice Egan is "a very old man but new appointee."189 He 
may be called the maverick of the group. He used a test which 
provided that a pregnant woman can terminate her pregnancy if 
'carrying it to term would probably involve a real and substantial 
risk to the mother, and it is irrelevant if the risk comes from the 
mother's threats of suicide or from any other cause. I70 It was ba-
sically the same test that the Chief Justice and Justice McCar-
. thy used, but this version was more liberal because Justice Egan 
expressly provided for situations such as X's in the test itself. 
This supported his conclusion that X met her burden, but this 
test had the same problems as the other justices' tests - it had 
no foundation for its existence in this opinion. 
Justice Egan also stated in dicta that, in balancing Consti-
tutional rights, the right to life [in general] might not always be 
166. Id. at 97 
167. Id. JR. CONST. art. 40, § 3(2). 
168. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
169. See supra note 127. 
170. X at 101. 
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paramount to other rights in every case.171 This dicta helped to 
support his reason for finding for X172 in this case. He claimed 
that travel ranks lower than the right to life because there is a 
difference between leaving a jurisdiction to commit a crime 
which is not illegal, and removing a fetus from the jurisdiction 
with the stated intent to terminate the life of that fetus. 173 This 
was important to him because the court has a duty to "defend 
and vindicate" the right to life of the fetus, so the right to travel 
cannot take precedence over that right.174 This was a reasonable 
and judicially supportable position. However, it seemed inconsis-
tent with the earlier portion of his opinion, that a defendant like 
X should be allowed to travel abroad for an abortion. By having 
been noncommittal here, Justice Egan failed to express a clear 
position on abortion rights. 
Justice Hederman, the sole dissenter, is "very conserva-
tive."17~ First, he asserted that in interpreting an article of the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court must give the words their ordi-
nary meaning with necessary consideration to the other Consti-
tutional Articles. 176 This was a direct attack on the Chief Jus-
tice's "prevailing ideas and concepts" approach.177 Justice 
Hederman made it clear that his decision would be based solely 
on a strict interpretation of the Constitution. This was a recog-
nized and legitimate stance (similar to that of Justice Black of 
the U.S. Supreme Court) - if only he had remained faithful to 
it. 
He asserted that "the right to self-determination" cannot 
supersede protection of the fetus. 178 This also was a legitimate if 
not harsh posture. But by having made this assertion, he insinu-
ated that X was seeking to preserve her bodily integrity, rather 
than her life. Justice Hederman did not openly accuse her of 
171. He used an example in which a father killed a man who had raped his daugh-
ter. Justice Egan felt that in such a circumstance the girl's bodily integrity prevails over 
the rapist's life. I d. at 102. 
172. Id. at 101. 
173. {d. at 102. 
174. This is true even though the mother would rarely make such intentions known 
to the authorities, and it would be difficult for the courts to supervise court orders pro-
scribing mothers from leaving the jurisdiction to obtain an abortion. Id. 
175. See supra note 127. 
176. X at 78. 
177. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. 
178. X at 79. . 
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that, but it is clear that he was hostile to her cause. His position 
on abortion was clear at this point. He stated that it is a 
mother's "duty to carry out the pregnancy" [emphasis added], 
and the State must do everything reasonably possible to pre-
serve [fetal] life.179 He stayed true to that position by saying 
that the preservation of unborn life is paramount to the 
mother's right to travel. 180 But by taking such a harsh position, 
he broke his promise to give the words in the Constitution their 
ordinary meaning. In taking such an automatically narrow view 
on abortion, he effectively rejected the express Constitutional 
provision that due regard should be paid to the mother's life. 
Justice Hederman then deviated from his staunch position 
on abortion by establishing an abortion rights test of his own. 
His test provided that the evidence necessary to allow an abor-
tion, in order to save the mother's life, "be of such weight and 
persuasion as to leave open no other conclusion but that . . . 
continuance of the pregnancy will, to an extremely high degree 
of probability, cost the mother her life and that any such opin-
ion must be based on the most competent medical opinion avail-
able."18l First, this test has no apparent legal precedent. He 
claimed that it stems from Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution182 
but did not explain how it stems from that Article. Second, even 
by having presented this test, he was being untrue to his belief 
that it is a woman's duty to carry a pregnancy to term. If that 
was how he really felt, what function would such a test serve? 
Th~ bottom line would always be that the mother would have to 
bear the child, according to Justice Hederman's interpretation of 
the law. 
In any event, he found a "remarkable paucity" of evidence 
to meet this standard.183 This conclusory finding seemed to be 
an ends-justifying-the-means apology for his being unfaithful to 
both the Constitution and his principles. 
Justice Hederman concluded that there was no certainty 
that the mother would die by suicide and that it would "not be 
179. [d. at 80. 
180. [d. 
181. [d. at 82. 
182. [d. 
183. Id. at 83. 
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impossible" to prevent X from committing suicide and save the 
fetus l84 as X had loving parents and others to support her. How 
he determined that it would be possible to prevent X from com-
mitting suicide is not clear. It simply was not a realistic 
suggestion.181! 
The law as a result of the Supreme Court's opinions in this 
case is that a woman seeking an abortion in Ireland must prove 
that there is probably a real and substantial risk to her life 
which can only be prevented by the woman having an abortion. 
If she can meet this burden, she will be free to travel to a juris-
diction where abortion is legal to have the procedure performed. 
Although the analysis the majority of the Supreme Court 
used to reach its conclusion in X was questionable, the conclu-
sion was nevertheless correct. Allowing X to abort'was implicitly 
mandated by the fundamental Constitutional provision which 
requires "[that the state] assure the dignity and freedom of the 
individual."186 Giving women the right to control their own bod-
ies and destinies is at least consistent with assuring their dignity 
and freedom. , 
III. PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. CASEY 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey involved a Pennsylvania law 
in which various provisions attempted to restrict abortion rights 
further than Roe or its progeny seemingly would have allowed. 
However, claiming to affirm Roe's basic holding, the United 
States Supreme Court upheld all but one of the abortion restric-
tions in the Pennsylvania law. This decision, in effect, created 
new law on abortion rights. As with all U.S. Supreme Court 
cases, the decision in this case was intended to be the definitive 
word on abortion law in the United States, but this objective has 
failed. 187 
184, [d, 
185, Even if X's parents could keep twenty-four hour care over her to prevent her 
from killing herself, how could the thousands of other women (or girls) who do not have 
such supportive loved ones be cared for? How are they to be prevented from committing 
suicide? Is Justice Hederman prepared to en'gage the State in twenty-four hour care of 
such woman (or girls)? If that is the case, he should have proposed a plan for how the 
State would provide such care, 
186, See supra note 167, 
187, See infra note 264, 
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A. F ACTS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND HOLDING 
In Casey, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of five provisions in the Pennsylvania Abortion 
Control Act of 1982 as amended in 1988 and 1989.188 The first 
provision at issue required that a woinan seeking an abortion be 
given "anti-abortion" information18S before the procedure, that 
she certify in writing that she is procuring the abortion consen-
sually with the knowledge provided above, and that she wait 24 
hours prior to the procedure. ISO The next provision required that 
a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent before having 
an abortion, but this provision allowed for a judicial bypass lSI of 
this requirement. ls2 The third provision required that a preg-
nant woman seeking an abortion provide a signed statement say-
ing that she had informed her husband that she was having the 
procedure, but this provision contained some exceptions includ-
ing medical emergencies. ISS The final provision required that 
abortion facilities provide the state with certain information re-
lated to the specific abortions performed in each facility and 
general abortion statistics about each facility. IS. 
Before any of the provisions were to take effect, Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania (consisting of five 
abortion clinics) and a doctor representing himself and a class of 
doctors who perform abortions brought suit seeking a declara-
tory judgment stating the provisions were facially unconstitu-
tional and injunctive relief based thereon. lSI! The District Court 
held for petitioners, claiming that five provisions were unconsti-
tutional and granted permanent injunctive relief from their en-
forcement. lsB The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and re-
versed in part, upholding all but the spousal notification 
requirement. ls7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard 
188. Casey at 2803. 
189. See infra notes 200-201 and accompanying text. 
190. Casey at 2803. 
191. See infra notes 206-208 and accompanying text. 
192. Casey at 2803. 
193. Id. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text. 
194. Casey at 2803. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text. 
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the case on April 22, 1992.198 In a plurality opinion, it affirmed 
the Court of Appeals' judgment in its opinion of June 29, 
1992.199 
B. IMPLICATIONS OF CASEY TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 
The Casey decision resulted in a severe interference with a 
woman's right to secure an abortion in Pennsylvania. It also dis-
couraged Pennsylvania doctors and abortion facilities, especially 
public facilities, from providing abortions. 
First, Pennsylvania's doctors who perform abortions must 
now provide their patients seeking abortions with information 
discouraging them from having the procedure performed.20o For 
example, the required information stresses the unpleasant medi-
cal aspects of abortion by including unnecessarily graphic details 
about the procedure itself and risks involved with the proce-
dure. 201 Such extensive "forced knowledge" clearly goes beyond 
necessary informed consent. Nevertheless, a woman who would 
rather not know specifically about the details of the abortion 
procedure will be forcibly exposed to them. She may be dis-
suaded from undergoing the abortion due to a newly formed 
aversion of and unnecessarily increased fears of procuring the 
procedure. 
If that information does not dissuade her, perhaps addi-
tional information about the fetus itself may change her mind. 
The doctor must inform the patient of the probable gestational 
age of the fetus and tell the patient about free brochures the 
state offers which personalize the fetus. 202 Such knowledge could 
easily evoke an emotional response from the patient toward the 
fetus which she might not otherwise have possessed going into 
the procedure or which she might have fought to overcome. Such 
new emotions might make the patient decide against having the 
procedure regardless of whether she can physically, mentally 
and/or financially afford to take her pregnancy to term. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 2833. 
200. See infra notes 201-203 and accompanying text. 
201. Id. at 2833. 
202. Id. at 2833-34. 
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If this knowledge were not enough to discourage the patient 
from having the abortion, the required information about the 
availability of possible medical financial aid for the patient, al-
ternatives to abortion and the right to receive child support 
from the father may further dissuade her from choosing abor-
tion. 203 Knowledge of the availability of these alternatives could 
give the patient a sense of future financial aJ;ld emotional 
security. 
If all of the above does not dissuade her, the mandatory 
twenty-four hour waiting period204 might finally make her have 
doubts and change her mind because it allows all of the above 
information to be processed and embedded in the patient's 
mind. It also has an impact on the poor and on women who 
must travel from rural communities to have the procedure. Most 
of them cannot afford to lose more time to receive abortions be-
cause of their meager financial condition or their lengthy com-
mute. Thus, the waiting period can further wear down the pa-
tient emotionally and mentally such that she will no longer 
continue with the procedure. This requirement, as well as those 
listed above, goes well beyond informed consent.2011 
Next, a non-emancipated minor seeking an abortion in 
Pennsylvania must obtain the consent of one of her parents 
before she can have the procedure performed.206 This require-
ment can be bypassed only if there is a medical emergency or by 
judicial decree.207 A judge may authorize a doctor to perform an 
abortion on a minor if the judge determines it is in the minor's 
best interests.208 Thus, if a Pennsylvania minor does not have a 
parent's consent to procure' an abortion, if her life or health is 
203. Id. at 2834. 
204. Id. at 2833-34. The waiting period smacks of gender bias and is very conde-
scending toward women. Why can Pennsylvania not trust its adult female citizens to 
make responsible decisions about this medical procedure before entering a hospital? The 
male citizens of Pennsylvania do not need to wait for a mandatory period of time before 
undergoing vasectomies or any other medical procedure. 
205. Clearly any Pennsylvania woman contemplating an abortion will be forced to 
undergo a barrage of state-endorsed, anti-abortion propaganda before she can have the 
procedure performed. She will thus have to prepare herself mentally for that event even 
before having the abortion and still preserve enough energy to recover from the proce-
dure physically. 
206. Id. at 2834. 
207. Id. at 2834-35. 
208. Id. at 2835. 
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not in great danger or if a judge does not give authorization for 
her to have an abortion, she must carry the pregnancy to full 
term. 
Finally, for every abortion a doctor performs in Pennsylva-
nia he or she must provide the state with a report including his 
or her name, the name of any other doctor(s) involved in the 
procedure, the county and state where the patient resides, the 
patient's age, the number of the patient's prior pregnancies and 
abortions, the type of procedure performed, the weight of the 
aborted fetus, the gestational age of the fetus, the basis for any 
medical emergency, and the patient's marital status.209 Further-
more, a facility where legal abortions take place, whether it is a 
clinic or hospital, must report how many total abortions it per-
forms at the facility, and how many total abortions the facility 
performs in each trimester of pregnancy.210 This report must be 
filed on a quarterly basis.211 If the facility received any state 
funding within the preceding twelve month period before filing 
the report, the report will be available for public review and cop-
ying.212 Requiring this information would obviously discourage 
doctors from performing abortions in any remotely public facil-
ity out of fear of harassment from anti-abortion groups and indi-
viduals. Facilities receiving state funds may have the same con-
cerns. Consequently, this could drastically reduce the number of 
doctors and facilities willing to perform abortion in public facili-
ties. Those who would suffer most, as a result of the reporting 
requirement, are the poor women who could not afford to obtain 
abortions in priv~te clinics or hospitals where most abortion ac-
tivity would then likely take place. 
The only "positive" aspect of the Casey decision is that 
women need not give their husbands notice before having an 
abortion.213 Ironically, this barely became law. Had the swing 
vote on this issue been otherwise in Casey, a married woman in 
Pennsylvania would have had to notify her husband before get-
ting an abortion and sign a statement that she had notified 
209. [d. at 2835-36. 
210. [d. at 2837-38. 
211. [d. at 2838. 
212. [d. 
213. [d. at 2803. 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss3/9
1993] U.S. & IRISH ABORTION LAW 1031 
him.214 The exceptions would have been a woman with a medical 
emergency, her husband not being the father of the fetus, the 
fetus being the result of an officially reported spousal sexual as-
sault, or the notification potentially resulting in the husband or 
a third person physically harming the wife.216 
Abortion provisions similar to those in Pennsylvania are ca-
pable of ratification in virtually any other U.S. jurisdiction be-
cause of this decision. Therefore, women throughout the nation 
are at serious risk of similar interference with their rights, and 
doctors who perform abortions and facilities which provide abor-
tions may be deterred from continuing with their practices. 
Since Casey has substantially diluted Roe,216 Pennsylvania and 
other jurisdictions may attempt to write even more stringent 
abortion regulations which would likely pass muster under the 
Casey undue burden test.217 The Casey decision may be the 
commencement of alarming changes to come in American abor-
tion law. 
C. THE PLURALITY'S JUDICIAL DISHONESTY USEP TO ApPEASE THE 
PUBLIC 
The Casey plurality opinion was basically decided on three 
distinct judicial approaches toward Roe. One was completely 
supportive of Roe. Another supported an extremely diluted ver-
sion of it. The last one overruled it. 
Not surprisingly, Justice Blackmun completely supported 
Roe218 and followed its reasoning exactly when deciding Casey. 
He found that, based on the strict scrutiny standard articulated 
in Roe,219 none of the provisions at issue could pass constitu-
tional muster and thus had to be stricken.220 
Justice Stevens also basically supported Roe in his opinion. 
214. [d. at 2836-37. 
215. [d. 
216. See infra notes 224-34 and accompanying text. 
217. See infra note 227 and accompanying text. 
218. Justice Blackmun authored the Roe opinion. 
219. Strict scrutiny is a standard of review which provides that state legislation, 
attempting to regulate a fundamental right, may be upheld only if it is necessary to 
promote a compelling state interest. Roe at 153-55. 
220. Casey at 2845-54. 
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He too found that none of the provisions could pass constitu-
tional muster based on Roe or its progeny.22l 
The plurality opinions which decided that the mandatory 
information and twenty-four hour waiting period, parental con-
sent and data reporting requirements were constitutional were 
divided into two camps. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter 
comprised one group, while the other consisted of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, White and Thomas. Although the 
two sides reached the same conclusion, their approaches were re-
markably different.222 
A large segment of the O'Connor group's holding was con-
sumed by the importance of stare decisis and institutional integ-
rity.223 The first words in the O'Connor opinion were, "Liberty 
finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."224 She later stated, 
"The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity .... 
Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own 
Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect 
for precedent is by definition, indispensable .... At the other 
extreme, a different necessity would make itself felt if a prior 
judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its 
enforcement was for that very reason doomed."225 [emphasis 
added]. Justice O'Connor also stated, "The promise of con-
stancy, once given, binds its maker for as long as the power to 
stand by the decision survives and the understanding of the is-
sue has not changed so fundamentally as to render the commit-
ment obsolete. . . . [T]he legitimacy of the Court must be 
earned over time. . . . The Court's concern with legitimacy is 
not for the sake of the Court but for the sake of the Nation to 
which it is responsible."226 These statements by themselves 
could have been very. reassuring to those who feared this deci-
sion would overturn Roe. 
However, Justice O'Connor manipulated the language In 
221. Id. at 2838-43. 
222. As for the spousal notification requirement, the group drew completely oppo-
site conclusions. Justice O'Connor's camp struck it down, id. at 2830, while Justice Rehn-
quist's camp upheld it. Id. at 2873. 
223. See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text. 
224. Casey at 2803. 
225. Id. at 2808. 
226. Id. at 2815-16. 
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Roe. She and Justices Kennedy and Souter affirmed Roe's "es-
sential holding" that a woman has a right "to choose to have an 
abortion before viability without undue interference from the 
state."227 [emphasis added]. However, this "undue interference" 
language was not part of the decision in Roe. Roe used a strict 
scrutiny standard to determine whether a state abortion regula-
tion was unconstitutional.228 Also, Justice O'Connor's opinion 
put a greater emphasis on state power to restrict abortions after 
fetal viability than Roe229 and subsequent cases did.230 Justice 
O'Connor's group then took the "undue interference" introduc-
tion one step further and embedded it in federal abortion law by 
stating, "[T]he undue burden standard is the appropriate means 
of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitution-
ally protected liberty."231 What happened to stare decisis and 
institutional integrity? How could Justice O'Connor's group 
speak so elqquently of these concepts and then abruptly aban-
don them? It seems that these concepts were much more dispen-
sable to this group than they had earlier proclaimed. 
This group further decided that the trimester framework 
was overly rigid and not part of the essential holding of Roe. 232 
For these reasons, the group rejected the trimester framework. 233 
Roe's critics may have thought the trimester framework was not 
the best system for determining when and how a state could reg-
ulate abortions, but was it "so clearly [in] error that its enforce-
ment was for that very reason doomed?"234 This could only be 
answered in the negative because the States have relied on and 
used this framework for twenty years. 
With these amendments to Roe, Justice O'Connor's group 
proceeded to determine the validity of the challenged provisions. 
The group first considered the informed consent and twenty-
four hour waiting period requirements and upheld them.2311 In so 
doing, these three justices overruled Akron v. Akron Center for 
227. Id. at 2804. 
228. See supra note 219. 
229. Roe at 163-65 (viability/trimester test). 
230. Casey at 2817. 
231. Id. at 2820. 
232. Id. at 2818. 
233. Id. 
234. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
235. Casey at 2822-26. 
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Reproductive Health236 which invalidated an ordinance requir-
ing that a patient wanting an abortion be provided with infor-
mation which would influence her decision so that she would 
choose to carry the pregnancy to term.2S7 Akron also invalidated 
a twenty-four hour waiting period. These three justices over-
ruled Akron and an extension of it in Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists238 because of "Roe's 
acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life."239 
Again, where is the clarity in error in Akron and Thornburgh 
that their enforcement was for that reason doomed?240 In truth, 
there is no such clear error in them. 
Moreover, how could these three justices have allowed the 
state to require that doctors give patients anti-abortion propa~ 
ganda?Ul Such information clearly has moralistic overtones 
which stem from Judeo-Christian religious beliefs. The Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment242 to the United States 
Constitution mandates the separation of church and state in the 
federal government. This separation also applies to state govern-
ments because the Establishment Clause has been extended to 
the states.243 Therefore, the state mandating the distribution of 
such propaganda may be construed as unconstitutional on First 
Amendment grounds. Justice O'Connor's group failed to address 
the religious issue at all. Instead, this group determined that the 
provision passed muster based on the undue burden test.244 This 
group found that the requirement of telling a woman of the 
availability of information about fetal development and state 
child assistance, information that might make her choose birth 
over abortion, is reasonable, not a substantial obstacle and not 
236. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
237. Casey at 2823. 
238. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747 (1986). In Thornburgh, a number of Pennsylvania abortion regulations were being 
considered, one of which required that a woman be given written material about the 
abortion, including information about fetus development. The Court struck it down us· 
ing the strict scrutiny standard. 
239. Casey at 2823. 
240. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
241. See supra notes 201·203 and accompanying text. 
242. The Constitution provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting the estab. 
lishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
243. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
244. Casey at 2823·24. 
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an undue burden.246 In upholding the twenty-four hour waiting 
period, this group held that decisions made after "a period of 
reflection" will be more "informed and deliberate."246 In up-
holding these requirements, Justice O'Connor's group was being 
extremely paternalistic. It was telling the American woman that 
she cannot be trusted to make intelligent and informed decisions 
concerning her own body without state supervision and control. 
Furthermore, the group stated that "the waiting period is a 
reasonable measure to implement the State's interest in protect-
ing the life of the unborn, a measure that does not amount to an 
undue burden."247 [emphasis added]. Simply by referring to the 
fetus as a "life," Justice O'Connor's group made this decision 
based on the Christian premise that a fetus is in fact a life - a 
person.248 This premise is not universally accepted. Further-
more, it not only violates the First Amendment Establishment 
Clause but also offends Roe which explicitly rejected the concept 
that a fetus is a person.249 
In considermg the parental consent provision, this group of 
three justices upheld it in accordance with their interpretation 
of Akron I and II, Hodgson and Bellotti II. 260 Justice 
O'Connor's group stated that it would affirm a parental consent 
requirement as long as a judicial bypass is available261 which the 
Pennsylvania provision expressly allows. 
The group also upheld most of the record keeping provision 
because "it is a vital element of medical research."262 Neverthe-
less, the group offered no proof that this information is or can be 
vital to medical research. It does, however, increase the cost of 
abortion, which the group admitted, but these justices did not 
concede that it creates an undue burden.263 
245. [d. 
246. [d. at 2825. 
247. [d. 
248. Roe at 160-61. 
249. [d. at 159-61. 
250. Casey at 2832. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); 
Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).; Hodgsen v. Minnesota, 497 
U.S. 417 (1990); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
251. Casey at 2832. 
252. [d. 
253. [d. at 2833. 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's group reexamined the "funda-
mental right" in Roe because the "state of our post-Roe deci-
sional law dealing with the regulation of abortion is confusing 
and uncertain. "2114 This group found that "the Roe court reached 
too far when it analogized the right to abort a fetus to the rights 
involved in Pierce, Meyer, Loving and Griswold21111 and thereby 
deemed the right to abortion fundamental."2118 This group also 
focused on the traditional principle of stare decisis21i7 but opted 
to comply with that principle on the group's own terms by de-
claring that the proper standard for determining the constitu-
tionality of abortion regulations is "minimal scrutiny."2118 Based 
on this standard, Chief Justice Rehnquist's group easily upheld 
all the provisions at issue. 2119 
The sum of the Supreme Court's opinions in this case re-
sulted in new abortion rights law in the United States. States 
are now free to restrict a woman's right to pre-viability abortions 
provided that such states do not create an undue interference 
with that right. 
254. [d. at 2854. 
255. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the Constitution 
protects personal decisions about child rearing and education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that students have a Constitutional right to acquire knowledge); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that marriage is a Constitutional right); 
and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the Constitution protects 
personal decisions about contraception). 
256. Casey at 2860. 
257. The Chief Justice's group began its argument by using the Black's Law Dic-
tionary definition of stare decisis: "to abide by, or adhere to, decided cases." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990). This group then liberally criticized the O'Connor 
group's concept of stare decisis. Casey at 2860-67. Next, it stated, "In our view, authen-
tic principles of stare decisis do not require that any portion of the reasoning in Roe be 
kept intact ... 'Stare decisis is not ... a universal, inexorable command,' especially in 
cases involving interpretation of the Federal Constitution (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil 
& Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)." [d. at 2860-61. This state-
ment. about stare decisis was problematic not only because it was not legally binding but 
because it conflicted with the definition of stare decisis with which the Chief Justice's 
group began this discussion. By having laid this weak foundation for its opinion, this 
group needed to present an extremely persuasive argument in the remainder of its opin-
ion to redeem itself intellectually, which it failed to do. The Chief Justice's group over-
ruled Roe based on many more dissenting (non-legally binding) opinions, including the 
dissent in Roe. Casey at 2867-73. 
258. [d. at 2867. Minimal scrutiny is the standard of review which requires that a 
rational relationship between a state regulation and a legitimate state objective exist. 
WiJliamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). 
259. Casey at 2873. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Irish Court's approach to abortion law was superior to 
the American Court's approach in these cases. 
The majority of the Irish Court was responding to change in 
the public's opinion about abortion. The public felt very deeply 
that X should be allowed to abort despite Ireland's firm abortion 
law, for which the conservative majority voted in 1983,260 the 
one which specifies that abortions be given only when true risks 
to the mother's life exist. 261 This risk to the mother's life did not 
exist in X. The facts simply could not support that conclusion. 
The truth was that it was unfair to force a mere fourteen year 
old child to bear a child that was the product of a violent crime. 
The majority of the court tried to make its decision by actually 
grounding it in the law while, at the same time, responding to 
. the public's perception of equity. Although its analysis was 
flawed, it tried to fulfill its duty as a public servant while creat-
ing an avenue of relief for victims like X. The result of its efforts 
was to obscure Ireland's previously clear and solid abortion law. 
In Casey, three U.S. Justices (Justice O'Connor's group) 
gave lip service to the importance of precedent and to how they 
were going to keep Roe intact. These three Justices were surely 
aware that the majority of the public thinks favorably of Roe.262 
Therefore, they were compelled not to overtly' overturn Roe, re-
alizing that Roe has been an important part of American law for 
twenty years and could not easily be thwarted. Seemingly those 
three members of the Court felt that "affirming Roe's essential 
holding" was enough to appease the large numbers of the popu-
lation which 'support Roe. But then those three justices not only 
debased the basic structure (the trimester scheme) of Roe but 
eviscerated it by changing the "strict scrutiny" test (when 
checking the validity of a state abortion regulation) to the "un-
due burden" test. Under this new, less demanding test, abortion 
regulations and restrictions will pass muster much more easily 
than they would have under Roe's actual test. This group thus 
260. See supra note 122. 
261. See supra note 32. 
262. Ronald Brownstein, The Times Poll; Party Coalition May Be Fracturing 
Under Bush, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1992, at AI. 
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took away with one hand what it "gave" (i.e., promising to keep 
Roe intact) with the other. The only plausible reason for this 
troubling decision was the justices' subjective belief that abor-
tion rights should be extremely limited. 
Four other justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist's group) sought 
to overturn Roe. Their unfavorable views toward Roe were no 
secret, and they would criticize any other opinion which did not 
overturn Roe. However, they were no more convincing in their 
arguments than Justice O'Connor's group. They also alleged re-
spect for stare decisis yet failed to adhere to it, predominantly 
basing their decision on dissenting opinions in other cases, in-
cluding the dissenting opinion in Roe. 263 These dissents did not 
carry any precedential value. Chief Justice Rehnquist's group 
thereby fulfilled its subjective agenda with respect to abortion. 
The combination of the opinions in Casey has not clarified 
Roe. If anything, it has made abortion law in the U.S. even more 
obscure than it was under Roe's strict scrutiny standard which 
had been successfully used by the states for twenty years. The 
states must now contend with a new, untested standard. More-
over, Casey has substantially weakened an American woman's 
right to privacy in the area of abortion. The final judgment in 
Casey has left American women vulnerable to more state inter-
ference in their right to procure abortions, especially as con-
servative legislators create new barriers to abortion and have 
them tested by the current Court, the majority of which shares a 
conservative ideology. 
An important lesson that these two cases teach is that 
highly political or moral cases make ambiguous law. Such judi-
cial decisions keep the issues in the political arena, but ulti-
mately the public returns to the legislature or the courts to clar-
ify such laws.264 
263. See supra note 257. 
264. Ireland has already held a referendum, regarding abortion, in response to the 
Irish Supreme Court's decision in X. The proposed laws purported to liberalize Irish 
abortion law in a variety of ways. However, the result of the referendum was unclear. 
Both the conservative and liberal factions of the public claimed victory. Alan Murdoch, 
Both Sides Claim Victory in Abortion Vote, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 28, 1992, at 1. In 
the U.S., courts in Louisiana and Guam questioned what abortion law is in the United 
States even after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Casey. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. (1992) (issue 
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The most remarkable aspects about X and Casey are their 
ironic outcomes. On one hand, Ireland is a Catholic country with 
a Constitution that honors religion and gives the Catholic 
Church a special position.28~ The Irish Constitution expressly 
opposes abortion (which is clearly a Catholic position) in all but 
the most extreme situations. Yet, the Irish Supreme Court de-
cided in X to allow an unlikely candidate to procure an abor-
tion. Its conclusion was humanitarian and respectful of this girl's 
individual liberty and reproductive freedom. The majority of the 
Irish justices made this controversial decision despite Ireland's 
Catholic paternalistic nature. 
On the other hand, the U.S. Constitution shuns established 
religion,288 and "[n]o right is held more sacred or is more care-
fully guarded by the common law than the right of every indi-
vidual to the possession and control of his own person, free from 
all restraint or interference of others .... "287 Regardless of 
these "traditions," the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in Casey, 
that a state can severely restrict a woman's right to terminate a 
pregnancy. The true reason for the U.S. Supreme Court's up-
holding the restrictions reviewed in Casey stems from its adher-
ence to the Christian belief that a fetus is a "life" (rather than a 
"potential life" - a non-moralistic, non-religious view of a fe-
tuS).288 The Court thus regulated American morality on the 
abortion issue under the guise of Constitutional mandate. In de-
ciding Casey in this manner, it raised the Constitution to the 
level of a religious instrument which caused the Constitution to 
violate itself i.e., the Fourteenth Amendment. Now, women's re-
productive rights and freedom can be scrutinized and regulated 
much more strictly than many other medical procedures - even 
more serious and life-threatening ones. This is clearly violative 
was whether Guam's total ban on abortion, except in medical emergencies, was facially 
unconstitutional). Sojourner v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992) (concerned Louisi-
ana Abortion Statute which criminalized abortions except under extremely limited 
circumstances). 
265. The Irish Constitution provides, "The State acknowledges that the homage of 
public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence and shall 
respect and honor religion. The State recognizes the special position of the Holy Catholic 
Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the faith professed by the great major-
ity of the citizens." IR. CONST. art. 44, § 1 (1-2). 
266. See supra note 242. 
267. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
268. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text. 
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of the United States' purported anti-religious establishment and 
pro-individual liberties position. 
Apparently, even a Catholic country like Ireland is progress-
ing in the area of individual liberties by making its anti-abortion 
law more liberal. The United States, however, is regressing in 
this area by allowing the states to greatly restrict and interfere 
with its previously liberal abortion laws. Ironically, the laissez-
faire United States could learn a lesson from paternalistic 
Ireland. 
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